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The papers by Bulow, Sachs, and White illustrate the interconnections
inherent in most important economic policy issues, not least those con-
cerning the structure of the international financial system. One of the
most timely of these issues is whether there should be an international
bankruptcy court for sovereign debt. Two of the three papers in this sym-
posium, those by Bulow and Sachs, provide brief answers to that question
within a more expansive essay on what is wrong with the international
financial system. Both argue that a thorough reform of the system is
needed; a bankruptcy court is an important side issue in Sachs’ view and
a distraction in Bulow’s. There are some similarities in their critiques, but
they differ fundamentally on the central issue of sovereign debt. Sachs
wants governments to provide more financial resources to heavily
indebted countries, including through the international financial institu-
tions (IFIs) and streamlined debt relief, to give those countries a fresh
start. Bulow wants governments and markets to provide fewer resources
because national and international institutions have squandered what has
been provided in the past, and he argues further that those institutions
should first be largely privatized. Sachs and Bulow cannot both be right
in their prescriptions for the international financial system. My judgment
is that they are both mostly wrong, but that is for another day.
Bulow and Sachs in their papers do provide a service. They remind us
that the issue of sovereign debt is connected with the structure of eco-
nomic institutions and incentives for sound policies. Sachs also implicitly
reminds us that a well-functioning international ﬁnancial system must deal
with countries that differ in their economic and ﬁnancial circumstances
over time and across a broad continuum. Not all are perennial ﬁnancial
basket cases. At least four of the countries that Sachs identiﬁes as having
chronic, continuing debt crises—Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, and
Nigeria—were borrowers in international ﬁnancial markets on commercial
terms not so long ago. Further along the continuum, Turkey is not a new
member of the club of advanced industrial countries (the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development) whose external ﬁnancial crisis,
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have been admitted; Turkey has been a member of the club for many years.
Finally, during the era of ﬂoating exchange rates, even Italy, the United
Kingdom, and the United States have borrowed from the International
Monetary Fund. Circumstances change, and thus to consign all current
basket cases permanently to the international welfare rolls is fundamen-
tally ﬂawed as an initial premise.
I would like to address the issue of international bankruptcy arrange-
ments by posing three questions. First, is an international bankruptcy
court an appropriate solution to problems of sovereign debt? Second,
what are the connections between this concept and recent proposals for a
so-called sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM)? And third,
should we expect revolution or evolution going forward?
Bulow’s answer to the ﬁrst question is no: although the SDRM propos-
als may be a step in the right direction, a bankruptcy court is unnecessary.
Sachs’ answer is yes: such a court is needed to give countries a fresh start.
White says the analogy to domestic bankruptcy procedures is weak, but a
court or the equivalent may be needed if we are serious about solving the
three basic problems in this area that she and others have identiﬁed: rein-
ing in rogue creditors, providing seniority for private sector ﬁnancing to
countries while their debts are being restructured, and forcing closure on
the parties.
My own view is that an international bankruptcy court for sovereign
debt would be useful in addressing these problems, and it would be desir-
able (largely for the reasons advanced by Sachs), but it is not now feasi-
ble. It is closer to being feasible today than when I participated in drafting
the Group of Ten’s 1996 report (the Rey Report), but it is still not feasible
because the intellectual and political foundations have not yet been laid.
First, a consensus is still lacking about the economic principles upon
which such an institution should be based. For example, should it seek to
maximize the return to creditors or seek to give debtors a fresh start? Sec-
ond, political consensus is lacking. Sachs writes, “for hundreds of years,
sovereign borrowers have experienced repayment crises, including
defaults and restructuring of debts” without such an institution. The world
is not ready to turn over such judgments—and judgments are what would
be required—to a supranational body.
Addressing the second question, Anne Krueger has proposed, most
recently in a speech given just days before this conference, an SDRM-lite
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an SDRM-very-lite in the form of a decentralized, market-oriented
approach without an international statutory base.2 I would submit that nei-
ther proposal offers much promise with respect to the fundamental prob-
lem, which both Krueger and Taylor identify as inducing countries to
recognize sooner than they do now that their external debts (I would say
“external ﬁnancial circumstances”) are unsustainable.
The Taylor approach, relying on the widespread, semivoluntary inclu-
sion of a set of workout clauses in cross-border ﬁnancial contracts, falls
short on four crucial tests. First, it does not envision including such
clauses in the debt instruments of the U.S. government; consequently, it
fails to acknowledge that, when dealing with the global ﬁnancial system,
a global solution is needed. Second, the proposal does not envisage that
sovereign borrowers would include such clauses in their domestic obliga-
tions; consequently, such a mechanism would have been able to address
only one (Argentina) of the eight major external ﬁnancial crises of the
past eight years (in order of occurrence, Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia,
Korea, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina). Only the Argentine, Mex-
ican, and Russian crises involved principally sovereign debt, and only the
Argentine crisis involved principally sovereign debt issued on interna-
tional markets; most of the Russian and Mexican sovereign debt was
issued under domestic law. (Bulow is off the mark in reiterating his analy-
sis of the bias introduced in lending to sovereigns by the coverage of most
such lending by U.K. or U.S. law. There may have been such a bias in the
1980s, but not in the 1990s.) Third, the Taylor approach includes inade-
quate incentives to force the inclusion of such clauses in all relevant
ﬁnancial contracts, and therefore it is incomplete. Fourth, it would not
apply retroactively, and therefore its relevance is only to the distant
future.
The Krueger approach also fails the second test, for it, too, would not
in its current form cover sovereign debt issued under domestic law.
(Krueger states that it would be for consideration on a case-by-case basis
whether domestic debt should be covered by the mechanism, but that
elides the fundamental point. Unless the SDRM-lite embodies as a matter
of law the potential legal capacity to override domestic law governing the
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mally not allow such debt to be reached.) Thus it, too, would have dealt
with only one of the past eight crises. It addresses the third and fourth
tests by proposing an international treaty, in the form of an amendment to
the IMF Articles of Agreement, that would override national law. Her
approach, in effect, would establish an international sovereign bankruptcy
court outside the auspices of the IMF. However, the Krueger mechanism
would not involve an enforcement procedure either in White’s sense
(forcing a solution on the debtor country and its creditors if they cannot
agree) or in Bulow’s sense (forcing the debtor country to abide by the
terms to which it and its creditors have agreed). But even Krueger’s
SDRM-lite is not likely to be adopted; the authorities of each IMF mem-
ber country would have to agree to allow the new institution to override
their national laws. And again the beneﬁts of the proposed radical solu-
tion would apply at most to fewer than 15 percent of future crises. I say
“at most” because we should expect the international ﬁnancial system to
adapt to a regime with an SDRM-lite by further reducing the amount of
obligations that would come under its jurisdiction.
The fundamental failure with both approaches, however, is that they do
not deliver on what they claim with respect to the basic issue, namely,
inducing a country to address its external ﬁnancial situation promptly. (I
use the word “situation” to incorporate not just external sovereign debts,
and not just sovereign debts, but at least the full and diverse range of cir-
cumstances experienced in the eight principal external ﬁnancial crises of
the past decade.) For countries to do so, both the international ﬁnancial
community (acting through the IMF) and, more important, the debtor
country itself would have to agree that the country’s external ﬁnancial sit-
uation is unsustainable. In none of the recent cases did the debtor country
reach such a judgment on its own, and the international ﬁnancial commu-
nity did so only once, in the case of Argentina in August 2001. The reason
is that these are very complex judgments about external ﬁnancial sustain-
ability; they are further complicated in that, as Taylor correctly states,
“The aim of reforming the sovereign debt restructuring process is not to
reduce the incentives that sovereign governments have to pay their debts
in full and on time.”3 In other words, it is unfortunately unrealistic at this
time to think that countries are going to get Sachs’ “fresh start” before
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ings will remain a late resort, and restructurings will continue to be
incomplete on Sachs’ terms.
Finally, should we expect revolution or evolution in international
workout procedures? My earlier comments imply that one should not
expect revolution in the form either of Krueger’s SDRM-lite, Taylor’s
SDRM-very-lite, or Sachs’ debtor-friendly court. Instead we should
expect further continued evolution. I stress “continued” because, unlike
Bulow, who indicates that he has learned nothing since 1992, policymak-
ers have learned a good deal over the past decade, and the international
ﬁnancial system has already evolved substantially. For example, in 1995
Sachs wrote, “it is understood that bonds are not rescheduled, so that new
bond ﬁnancing would in practice have administrative priority over
rescheduled bank debt.”4 We have learned that that statement was untrue,
and we have learned that it was unfortunate that some borrowers and
creditors believed it was true.
Aside from the difﬁcult issue of external ﬁnancial sustainability, the
central argument of those favoring substantial reform of the sovereign
debt workout process is that there is a creditor coordination problem that
must be addressed. I believe that proposition has yet to be demonstrated
in practice, and I interpret Bulow as having reached the same conclusion
in theory when he asks “why such coordination requires international
intervention.” Financial market participants, in general, do not think that
they have coordination problems.
Going forward, once Argentina establishes a credible ﬁnancial program
that has the support of the IFIs, it will address its external debt problems.
We then will learn a great deal, including about creditor coordination
problems. If market participants want the authorities to appreciate that
coordination problems are minor or can be reasonably overcome, then the
major participants should demonstrate that fact in the Argentine case. If
they fail to do so, the issue of an improved SDRM-lite will be revisited. In
the meantime it will be in the interests of market participants also to take
seriously Taylor’s SDRM-very-lite proposal, because that is a stepping-
stone to SDRM-lite.
In the end, however, these are matters of balance. No solution deals
with all dimensions of all problems. Each intervention by the authorities—
Edwin M. Truman 345
4. Sachs (1995, p. 12).
0675-10 BPEA/Truman  7/22/02  1:10 PM  Page 345and each nonintervention by the authorities—blunts some incentives,
reducing optimal efﬁciency. Policymakers should listen to academics
about incentives and the effects of various proposed policies on incen-
tives, but the policymaker’s task is to exercise judgment and to seek a bal-
ance, which has more to do with political processes than economic theory.
Policymakers should be informed by theory and by history and experi-
ence. But in the end, they must exercise judgment.
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